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Professor Margaret Berger, the
Epitome of the Fully Engaged Scholar
and Friend of the Court
Edward J. Imwinkelried†
Today’s law professors are no longer content to remain
in the “ivory tower.” Rather, they aspire to be fully engaged in
the process of law reform. They not only hope that their
scholarship will be creative and theoretically sound; they also
want it to have real world impact. Margaret Berger’s scholarly
career is a model for any academic who entertains that
aspiration.
To be sure, Professor Berger is a prominent figure
within the “ivory tower.” For decades, she has been a coauthor
of one of the leading evidence casebooks, Evidence: Cases and
Materials, with Judge Weinstein and Professors Mansfield and
Abrams.1 Moreover, she has published widely cited articles in
many of the most highly regarded law reviews.2
However, her influence extends far beyond the world of
legal education. Law reform organizations have often turned to
her for guidance and insight. She has been a member of several
National Academy of Sciences committees, including the
Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science. She was
the Reporter for the Post-Conviction Issues Working Group of
the National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence. The
†
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prestigious Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and
Government has also called on her as a consultant.
For its part, the practicing bar pays special attention to
Professor Berger’s writing. She is the coauthor of the foremost
treatise on federal evidence law, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence:
Commentary on Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts
and Magistrates.3 I teach Trial Practice. I devote one class
session to evidentiary objections. In that session, I discuss the
question of which secondary authorities the trial attorney
should cite to the judge. I have told literally thousands of
students that when you have time at sidebar to cite only one
authority to a federal judge, that authority should be
Weinstein’s Evidence. It undeniably carries more weight with
sitting federal District Court judges than any other treatise or
text.
Judges not only have a high regard for Professor
Berger’s contributions to the Weinstein treatise; she has
published other works that are typically at the fingertips of
federal judges. After the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Daubert,4 the Federal Judicial Center decided that it
needed to provide the federal judiciary with research tools to
help judges deal more knowledgeably with scientific issues. The
center has released two editions of its celebrated Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence.5 Every federal District Court
judge in the United States has that text either on the bench or
in chambers. Professor Berger contributed substantial articles
to both editions. In the first edition, she authored “Evidentiary
Framework,”6 which gave judges an overview of the impact of
Daubert. The second edition includes her article, “The Supreme
Court’s Trilogy on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony.”7
That article not only contains further perspective on the
original Daubert decision; the article adds a discussion of
Daubert’s progeny, Joiner8 and Kumho.9 It was expectable that
3
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when the Judicial Conference reconstituted the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, Professor Berger
was named the first Reporter for the committee.
These facts give a sense of the extent of Professor
Berger’s influence. However, in this article I would like to focus
on the considerable influence she has had as a friend of the
Court—as the author of amicus briefs submitted to the United
States Supreme Court. During her long career, Professor
Berger has submitted a large number of amicus briefs in cases
pending before the Court.10 However, two amicus briefs are
especially noteworthy, namely, her amicus briefs in the original
Daubert litigation11 and her brief in the subsequent Kumho
case.12 A careful comparison of the contents of Professor
Berger’s briefs in those cases and the Court’s ultimate opinions
reveals the remarkable degree to which Professor Berger’s
arguments seemingly influenced the Court’s ruling and
reasoning in both decisions.
I.

PROFESSOR BERGER’S AMICUS BRIEF IN DAUBERT

In 1992, Professor Berger was the lead author of an
amicus brief in Daubert on behalf of the Carnegie Commission
on Science, Technology, and Government.13 In the long term,
one of the most important passages in Daubert will prove to be
Justice Blackmun’s observation that “arguably, there are no
certainties in science.”14 Prior to Daubert, many courts had
9

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
See, e.g., Motion for Leave to File and Brief Amicus Curiae of the Am. Civil
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U.S. 116 (1999) (No. 98-5881), 1998 WL 901782 (with Professor Richard Friedman of
the University of Michigan School of Law); Brief of Law Professors Paul F. Rothstein,
Ronald J. Allen, Margaret A. Berger et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner,
Office of the President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997) (No. 961783), 1997 WL 33549611; Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus
Curiae in Support of the Respondent, Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (No. 89260), 1989 WL 1127312; Brief of Margaret A. Berger and Jerome Kassirer as Amici
Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Sidharath v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp.
(11th Cir. 2001).
11
Brief of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102), 1992 WL 12006530 [hereinafter Daubert Amicus
Brief].
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Saltzburg as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
536 U.S. 127 (1999) (No. 97-1709), 1998 WL 762013 [hereinafter Kumho Amicus Brief].
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subscribed to the naïve belief that at least the “exact” sciences
could yield absolutely certain conclusions.15 Justice Blackmun
shattered that naïveté in Daubert. In her amicus brief in
Daubert, Professor Berger had urged the Court to do precisely
that. She noted that in the past, the courts had “assume[d] that
there is much more definiteness in science than actually
exists.”16 As she described the scientific process, even in fields
such as physics and chemistry the experimental/observational
“provisional”18
methodology
yields
only
“contingent,”17
conclusions. Since it is always conceivable that a subsequent
experiment will falsify a hypothesis supported by earlier
experiments, scientific investigators cannot lay claim to “final
or permanent” truth.19
In large part, the Court agreed with Professor Berger’s
position because the Court embraced her conception of the
scientific process itself. The brief repeatedly described the
essence of the scientific method as the “formulati[on] [of]
hypotheses”20 and “[r]igor[ous] . . . testing of [the] hypotheses”21
to validate or falsify them.22 Justice Blackmun’s description of
the scientific method in his lead opinion in Daubert is
strikingly similar: “a process for proposing and refining
theoretical explanations about the world that are subject to
further testing and refinement.”23
The Daubert Court drew a number of doctrinal
implications from its conclusions about the nature of the
scientific enterprise—the very implications that Professor
Berger identified in her amicus brief. First, Justice Blackmun
abandoned the traditional general acceptance test for the
admissibility of scientific testimony.24 The Justice characterized
15

Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits Jurassic Park: The FarReaching Implication of the Daubert Court’s Recognition of the Uncertainty of the
Scientific Enterprise, 81 IOWA L. REV. 55, 59-60 (1995).
16
Daubert Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at *9.
17
Id. at *5.
18
Id. at *9.
19
Id. at *4.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
See id. (“how science is conducted”); id. at *8 (“an extensive examination of
the hypotheses being put forth”); id. at *10 (“the process by which the theory was
generated or tested”).
23
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Brief for the Am. Assoc. for the Advancement of Sci. and the Nat’l
Acad. of Sci. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 7-8, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102), 2003 WL 13006281).
24
See id. at 587-89.
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the test as too “austere [a] standard.”25 He criticized the test as
being “at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules [of
Evidence].”26 In her brief, Professor Berger had asserted that a
realistic understanding of the nature of scientific methodology
“require[d] rejection” of the 1923 Frye27 case that announced the
general acceptance test.28 She explained that the traditional
test was “simplistic”29 and “incompatible with the essence of the
scientific endeavor.”30 She wrote that the Frye test, if “taken
literally[,] rejects valuable insights that bear all the hallmarks
of acceptable science.”31
Justice Blackmun supplanted the traditional standard
with an essentially methodological test.32 He declared that the
focus should be on the soundness of the scientific methodology
supporting the expert’s opinion33 rather than the judge’s view of
the correctness of the conclusion reached by the expert. The
Justice elaborated that the opinion’s proponent must convince
the trial judge that the opinion is “derived by the scientific
method,”34 that is, “supported by appropriate validation.”35
Those passages echoed the part of Professor Berger’s amicus
brief in which she argued that
[t]he question is not whether the judge agrees with the results of the
study . . . . Rather the court must decide whether the study was set
up and carried out in a manner that conforms to standards in the
scientific community.36

Professor Berger’s brief even anticipated the manner in
which Justice Blackmun would rationalize his holding as a
matter of statutory interpretation. He reasoned that “[t]he
primary locus” for deriving the test was Rule 702.37 More
specifically, he ruled that when marshaling testimony about
25

Id. at 589.
Id. at 588 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27
See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
28
Daubert Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at *2, *7.
29
Id. at 7.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Daubert Decision: Frye Is Dead, Long Live
the Federal Rules of Evidence, TRIAL, Sept. 1993, at 60, 62-63.
33
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
34
Id. at 590.
35
Id.
36
Daubert Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at *17; see also id. at *12 (“the
methodology”).
37
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
26
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the scientific methodology underpinning the expert’s opinion,
the proponent must demonstrate the expert’s reasoning is
reliable “scientific . . . knowledge” within the meaning of that
expression in Rule 702.38 This was the identical statutory basis
that Professor Berger’s brief singled out. Citing Rule 702, she
stated that the trial judge ought to inquire whether the
expert’s reasoning “conform[s] to the characteristics of
‘scientific knowledge.’”39
After announcing the general methodological test,
Justice Blackmun proceeded to list several factors that trial
judges should consider in deciding whether the expert’s opinion
rests on sound scientific methodology.40 His list is quite similar
to the list of such factors included in Professor Berger’s amicus
brief. The Justice’s list includes these factors:
• Whether the hypothesis is empirically testable;41
• Whether it has been tested;42
• Whether the research has been subjected to peer
review (although he cautioned that peer review “is not
a sine qua non of admissibility”);43
• Whether the hypothesis is generally accepted to the
extent that general acceptance is circumstantial
evidence that other scientists have scrutinized the
research and found it to be methodologically sound;44
and
• Whether the expert’s methodology has a known or
ascertainable error rate.45
The list in Professor Berger’s amicus is remarkably
parallel:
• Whether the theory “is capable of being proven false
through observation or experimentation”;46
• Whether the theory “has in fact been subjected to an
empirical scrutiny”;47

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Id. at 589-90 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
Daubert Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 11-12.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 594.
Id.
Daubert Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at *13.
Id. at *14.
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• Whether the research has been peer reviewed
(although she cautioned that peer review should not
be an invariable requirement);48
• Whether the theory has been generally accepted to the
extent that such acceptance is circumstantial proof
that other scientists have concluded that the
underlying research was “produced in conformity with
the scientific process”;49 and
• What the technique’s “error rate” is.50
Professor Berger’s brief not only sketched the basic
outline of Justice Blackmun’s opinion, it also furnished some of
the fine print. After describing the validation test he derived
from Rule 702, the Justice cited Rule 401 and added that to be
relevant, the expert’s theory must “fit” the specific facts of the
case.51 In her amicus brief, Professor Berger cited the same
statute and emphasized that to satisfy Rule 401, the expert’s
research has to “fit” the “facts in the case.”52 Procedurally,
Justice Blackmun stressed that Federal Rule 104(a) governs
the trial judge’s determinations under the validation test.53
Professor Berger made precisely that point in her brief.54 In
short, to a considerable extent, Professor Berger’s amicus brief
presaged the content of Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Daubert.
The coincidence is so extensive that the conclusion is well nigh
unavoidable that her brief was a major influence on the
Daubert Court’s decision.
II.

PROFESSOR BERGER’S AMICUS BRIEF IN KUMHO

Six years after its Daubert decision, the Supreme Court
revisited the topic of expert testimony in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd.
v. Carmichael.55 Kumho raised the question of the standard for
determining the admissibility of non-scientific expert
testimony.56 As in Daubert, Professor Berger was the lead

48

Id. at *25-28.
Id. at *5-6.
50
Id. at *16-17.
51
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 587, 590-91 (1993) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52
Daubert Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at *11, n.11.
53
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
54
Daubert Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at *12.
55
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
56
Id. at 141.
49
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author of an amicus brief in Kumho.57 Just as Justice
Blackmun’s opinion in Daubert reflected the persuasiveness of
her brief in that case, it is easy to discern the imprint of
Professor Berger’s amicus brief on Justice Breyer’s opinion in
Kumho. Professor Berger’s brief urged a balanced approach
which Justice Breyer endorsed in his opinion.
On the one hand, in her brief Professor Berger argued
that the rigorous validation standard enunciated in Daubert
was sometimes inappropriate for assessing the reliability of
non-scientific expertise such as medical testimony.58 In his
opinion, Justice Breyer concurred, observing that Daubert
“referred only to ‘scientific’ knowledge” because “‘that [wa]s the
nature of the expertise’ at issue” there.59 Elaborating, Professor
Berger asserted that in a case involving non-scientific
expertise, it would sometimes be wrong-minded to apply the
factors enumerated in Daubert.60 Justice Breyer approved of
that view in his opinion.61
Next, Professor Berger generally cautioned against
attempting to “construct a complex,” rigid classification system
of types of expertise.62 The Justice agreed, stating that “it would
prove difficult, if not impossible, for judges to administer
evidentiary rules under which a gatekeeping obligation
depended upon . . . distinction[s]” among various kinds of
expert testimony.63 In his judgment, “conceptual efforts” to
fashion such sharp distinctions were “unlikely to produce
clear . . . lines capable of application in particular cases.”64 More
specifically, Professor Berger asserted that, in at least some
57

Kumho Amicus Brief, supra note 12.
See id. at *4, *18.
59
Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 148 (alteration in original) (quoting Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.8 (1993)).
60
See Kumho Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at *4.
61
Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 150-51 (“We agree with the Solicitor General
that ‘[t]he factors identified in Daubert may or may not be pertinent in assessing
reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert’s particular expertise, and
the subject of his testimony.’ . . . [W]e can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and
for all time the applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we now do so
for subsets of cases categorized by category of expert or by kind of evidence” (first
alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137
(1999) (No. 97-1709), 2002 WL 541947).
62
Kumho Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at *14.
63
Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 148.
64
Id.; see also id. at 151 (“We do not believe that Rule 702 creates a
schematism that segregates expertise by type while mapping certain kinds of questions
to certain kinds of experts.”).
58
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instances, an expert’s experience could be an adequate
foundation for an opinion.65 Justice Breyer also posited that a
witness’s experience can be a sufficient basis for an expert
opinion.66
On the other hand, Professor Berger argued that the
trial judge must demand that the expert’s proponent
demonstrate that the expert’s opinion amounts to more than
the witness’s “‘subjective belief.’”67 For his part, Justice Breyer
came to the same conclusion.68 In her brief, Professor Berger
asserted that “experience-based knowledge should not be
automatically inadmissible . . . .”69 Likewise, Justice Breyer
stressed that the trial judge must scrutinize even “experiencedbased testimony.”70 Professor Berger contended that the judge
ought to insist that in preparing his or her testimony, the
expert “exercis[ed] the same level of intellectual rigor that
generally characterizes that expert’s field of expertise.”71 In
formulating his holding, Justice Breyer echoed Professor
Berger’s brief; he wrote that the trial judge must ensure that
“an expert, whether basing testimony on professional studies or
personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level
of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert
in the relevant field.”72
In the final analysis, Professor Berger called on the
Court to grant trial judges discretion both in applying Rule
702’s substantive admissibility standard and in devising
procedures for doing so. Substantively, Professor Berger
recommended that the Court “accord the trial judge a
substantial measure of discretion” in selecting the factors to be
used in gauging the reliability of nonscientific expertise.73 She
counseled against “bright-line test[s].”74 Procedurally, while
65

See Kumho Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at *6-7.
See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152.
67
Kumho Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at *13 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993))).
68
See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 147-48 (“In Daubert, the Court specified
that it is the Rule’s word ‘knowledge’ . . . that ‘establishes a standard of evidentiary
reliability.’ Hence, as a matter of language, the Rule applies its reliability standard to
all ‘scientific,’ ‘technical, or ‘other specialized’ matters within its scope.” (quoting
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 & n.8 (1993)).
69
Kumho Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at *19.
70
Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 151.
71
Kumho Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at *3.
72
Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152.
73
Kumho Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at *14.
74
Id. at *3.
66
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some had asked the Court to recognize a right to a pretrial
Daubert hearing, in her brief Professor Berger staked out the
position that the trial judge should also have a significant
measure of discretion in fashioning procedures for
administering Rule 702.75 In his opinion, Justice Breyer came
down on both issues in the same fashion. On the substantive
question, the Justice stated that “in a particular case,” the trial
judge has “broad latitude” in choosing the factors that are
“reasonable measures of reliability.”76 Procedurally, the Justice
declared:
The trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how
to test an expert’s reliability, and to decide whether or when special
briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate
reliability . . . . That standard applies as much to the trial court’s
decisions about how to determine reliability as to its ultimate
conclusion.77

CONCLUSION
It is fair to say that Daubert and Kumho are the two
most important expert testimony opinions ever rendered by the
United States Supreme Court. They not only control in federal
court; they have been widely cited and followed by state courts
as well.78 A comparison of those decisions with Professor Berger’s
amicus briefs reveals a remarkable degree of similarity between
the views she urged and the positions ultimately taken by the
Court. At the very least, Professor Berger is an incredible
prognosticator. More likely, though, her briefs were
instrumental in convincing the Court to embrace those positions.
By venturing beyond the “ivory tower” and joining the fray in
Daubert and Kumho, Professor Berger helped shape two of the
most important evidence decisions of this era. To a degree, her
amicus briefs provided the Court with blueprints for those
decisions, just as her distinguished career has become the
blueprint for any member of the academy who aspires to take up
the challenge of engaging in real world law reform.
75

See id. at *21-26; see also Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the
Daubert Test, supra note 2, at 1361-63.
76
Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 153; see also id. at 152 (“[A] trial court should
consider the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures
of the reliability of expert testimony.”).
77
Id. at 152 (emphasis omitted).
78
1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §
1.14 (4th ed. 2007).

